H. Lotze's critique of J. Muller's doctrine of specific sense energies among Muller's teachers at Bonn University around 1820, including the physiologists Christian Friedrich Nasse and Philip von Walther, Gottlob Kastner the friend of Schelling, and the botanist Nees von Esenbeck a friend of Goethe.'4 Therefore Muller, in speaking of "energies", was using current conceptions of the vital activity characteristic of life; however, in the implication that these were "specific" to each sense he departed from the classic view of von Haller that all sensory nerves had the sole property of sensitivity, undifferentiated by sense. 15 Actually Miiller did not employ the word "specific", but he clearly implied this when he wrote that "the optic nerve cannot even be affected without seeing itself luminous, the auditory nerve cannot be affected without sounding, the taste nerve not without tasting, et cetera." '6 In 1838, in his Handbuch der Physiologie des Menschen, he spelled this out further: all stimuli, whether chemical, mechanical, or electrical, give rise to a single kind of sensation in any given.sensory pathway; conversely, the same stimulus applied to different senses gives rise to different sensations. '7 Two formative experiences shed light on the origin of Muller's law, and they reflect his attitude towards experiment. By training under von Walther at Bonn and Rudolphi at Berlin, Muller was a physiologist and anatomist.'8 But by predilection he was a psychologist, and his teacher was Goethe; thus he wrote: "I have no second thoughts about admitting how very much I owe to the inducements of Goethe's colour theory, and can fairly say that without many years of studying it together with personal observation of the phenomena the present researches would not have arisen.'9 Goethe's theory of light was simply that light is white and cannot be split into colours.20 But Goethe's method, unlike Newton's, was psychological, for it asked the subject to describe the visual phenomena directly, regardless of It is false to claim with assurance that the higher sensory nerves always react to a stimulus exclusively by functional expressions, never by pain. The single experiment which seems to speak for the doctrine of specific nerve energy in a decisive way is the sectioning of the optic nerve, which as some claim is supposed to be accompanied not by pain but by a visual appearance. Around this one observation, if we want to be honest, the far-reaching doctrine of specific nerve energies has spread out, while supporting itself upon this sole analogy and repeatedly referring to it, it has established the two parts of its claim, that (1) every nerve reacts to inadequate stimuli by its functional expression, and (2) it also reacts exclusively by this. '7 In its antithesis, thought; it differed in its synthesis, however. Instead of the "Absolute Idea", Weisse's synthesis was Fiirsichseyn, "being for self", i.e., sensation, freedom, and "the postulation of oneself by specification"."' Lotze came to similar conclusions in his medical dissertation in 1838." The monad of Leibniz became for Lotze, as it been for Weisse, the best example of the enmergence of sensation in an otherwise mechanistic world description. The monad had an active capacity "to specify itself", and a passive capacity to occupy space and submit to change.3 Instead of Leibniz' attribute of mind, "perception", Lotze chose Weisse's term "specification", although he replaced it with "sensory quality" three years later in his first book, Metaphysik.37 Another important influence on Lotze's view of the nature of sensation was the Gottingen philospher, to whose chair Lotze was called in 1845, Johann Friedrich Herbart. Herbart opposed idealism with his own brand of realism, and he substituted a "hairsplitting manner" for the grand strokes of the dialectic.38 In his Metaphysik of 1828, Herbart took the example from Kant that "one hundred real coins contain not the least more than one hundred possible ones."39 Lotze, in William R. Woodward the being of an object as determined by its reference to real qualities, while Lotze regarded it as determined by reciprocal relations to other objects.41 Both opposed Hegel's identification of the qualities, which are thought, with the object, which exists, in the Absolute. By a similar line of argument, Lotze defined sensation as a kind of reciprocal relation between thought and object.42 When one monad "specifies" another, when one individual "perceives" another, and when a higher power "prescribes" the ends of the universe, the meaning or value of sensation reduces to an ethical judgment.43 Despite a realistic definition of sensation in the realm of being, Lotze conceded to it an idealistic definition in the realm of value.
Idealism and realism together were the groundwork of Lotze's philosophy; however he expressed them under the abbreviation of "occasionalism" in his scientific books which followed. In the Allgemeine Pathologie, he explained that "ideal qualities of sensitivity are incommensurable with the physical events which occasion them."" Neither the ideal event nor the real one need be neglected by the scientist. But it would be a mistake to understand them as reciprocal causes of one another, as Miller had done." Lotze noted that the qualities of sensations are "a production of the soul according to its own laws, and do not depend at all on the nature of the physical stimuli except that these offer signals for the soul to create ideas."46 A strict solution to the problem of the reciprocal effect between the soul and the body would have to go back to the origin of the concepts of matter, movement, and idea. However, the natural sciences need not reduce every single phenomenon to the true metaphysical relations which underlie it.47
The origin of Lotze's mechanistic conception of scientific explanation, as contrasted with his ideo-realistic views of the nature of reality, was Lotze answered Volkmann in 1846 in an essay called "Seele und Seelenleben", where he explained that by stimulus he meant the entire state of the nervous system." Volkmann had taken issue with a simple logical law, wrote Lotze, that equal conditions have equal consequences; hence, a certain state of the nervous system would always result in a certain sensation. Thus, the inception of Lotze's challenge to Muller was misunderstood in Halle, and it fell on deaf ears in Berlin and Leipzig.
It is worth pausing for a moment to consider this essay about the soul. Two hundred pages long, it dealt with the empirical nature of the soul (excluding free will, but including the phenomena of sensory quality, sensory localization, feeling, ideas, and the unity of consciousness), all of which the author attempted to relate to physiological conditions and the available explanatory principles of natural science. Wherever possible, it set forth hypotheses and theories for experimental investigation by a science of psychology as yet unfounded. For example, on the question of where the specificity of the senses originates, Lotze suggested two possible hypotheses: one was Volkmann's that some kind of correction apparatus limits a nerve to certain classes of sensations. Thinking that this was ruled out by the anatomical similarity of all nerves, Lotze preferred the other hypothesis of G. H. Meyer, that specific energies were only acquired habits in the nerves.61 The latter hypothesis was more easily reconciled with the cautionary advice of E. H. Weber, who wrote: "One should not, it seems to me, overestimate the influence of the central organs with which the inner endings of the nerves connect in the origin of specifically different sensations, nor should one underestimate the influence of the auxiliary organs in the external endings of the nerves."62 Actually, Lotze had adopted the hypothesis from Weber that the structure of the peripheral sense organs allowed only a certain class of stimuli to affect each sensory nerve, whereas the structure of the nerves themselves was identical and could play no role in the specificity of sensation.0
As for the qualitative differences in sensation within a given sense, further explanation was called for. Volkmann had criticized Muller harshly here: "The observation satisfies me that the red light wave transmits another sensation than the blue, and a slowly oscillating string another tone than a rapidly oscillating one. Herewith the doctrine of specific excitability is shaken in its foundation."" Lotze went even further, and suggested the "phantasy" that no qualitative differences could occur in the body which were not differences of magnitude, direction, duration, or a combination of these. This physical series of processes would release first the sensations of tone, gradually climbing to the sensations of colour. "Despite ' A. W. Volkmann, 6Nervenphysiologie', in ibid., 1844, vol. 2, p. 521, citing Lotze 
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William R. Woodward three disparate processes: the stimulus, the nervous excitation, and the conscious sensation. Lotze also replaced the "specific" determination of these energies, which for Muller was nothing more than an ascribed disposition, with a review of the evidence for qualitative differences at each stage in the chain of sensation. The stimuli could be adequate or inadequate by degrees. 71 The nerves maintain a specific tension, analogous to a string stretched between two points: disattach it at either end, and it can no longer resonate.72 Finally, the brain may be involved in the "vicarious sensations", known to us as "synesthesias", in which one sense sees, hears, smells, tastes, or feels for another. 73 Despite its prominence in three books from 1842 to 1852, as well as in Wagner's prestigious Handwirterbuch der Physiologie, Lotze's critique went unmentioned by Wundt as well as by Weber, Fechner, Helmholtz, and Muller himself. Yet if the agreement on the part of E. H. Weber, A. W. Volkmann, and Lotze is any measure, the criticisms were justified and the Muller doctrine, as it stood, was wrong.7' Why this neglect of a justified critique, and why the continued allegiance by Henle, Helmholtz, and others to an imperfect doctrine?
I suggest that an answer may be found in the Kuhn-Popper debate of the 1960s.75 Logical criticisms and data difficult to digest, especially when they come from a philosopher-physician who was not an experimenter, are not sufficient to bring down a scientific theory, much less to bring about a scientific revolution. Rather, it seems to be the case that personal prestige such as Muller commanded, not to mention a fundamental improvement by Helmholtz, did succeed in maintaining the theory for a time.
Only in this century has the tide turned back toward Lotze. The Muller doctrine had become almost unassailable after Helmholtz replaced the specific sensory pathways with specific fibres within the senses.76 In 1895, for example, von Frey proposed one kind of fibre for each of the four sensory qualities of touch-pressure, warmth, 71 Ibid., pp. 188-189.
